

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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Cypher/OTP.

PR I S E C

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

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(To United Kingdom Delegation to Peace Conference)

No. 1748.

D. 4.40 a.m. 4th October 1946.

4th October 1946.

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MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Personal for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.

Mr. Gallman brought to me late to-night the following message incorporating a statement which President Truman proposes to make to-morrow 4th October. I have asked the President to postpone making the statement until I have had time to consult you. In my immediately following telegram I send you my first reactions. I should be glad if I could have your views as soon as possible.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have just received the following message for you from the President:

"I deeply regret that it has been found necessary to postpone further meetings of the Palestine Conference in London until December 16th and I sincerely hope that it will be found possible in the interim to begin moving on a large scale the 100,000 displaced Jews in Europe who are awaiting admission to Palestine.

In view of the deep sympathy of the American people for these unfortunate victims of Nazi persecution in Europe and of the hopes in this country that a fair and workable solution of the Palestine problem be reached as soon as possible I find it necessary to make a further statement at once on the subject. Attached hereto is a copy of the statement which I am planning to issue to-morrow October 4th:

'I have learned with deep regret that the meetings of the Palestine Conference in London have been adjourned and are not to be resumed until December 16th, 1946. In the light of this situation it is appropriate to examine the record of the administration's efforts in this field, efforts which have been supported in and out of Congress by members of both political parties, and to state my views on the situation as it now exists.

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It will be recalled that when Mr. Earl Harrison reported on September 29th, 1945 concerning the condition of displaced persons in Europe, I immediately urged that steps be taken to relieve the situation of these persons to the extent at least of admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine. In response to this suggestion the British Government invited the Government of the United States to co-operate in setting up a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, an invitation which this government was happy to accept in the hope that its participation would help to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe and would assist in finding a solution for the difficult and complex problem of Palestine itself. The urgency with which this Government regarded the matter is reflected in the fact that a 120-day limit was set for the completion of the Committee's task.

The unanimous report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was made on April 20th, 1946 and I was gratified to note that among the recommendations contained in the report was an endorsement of my previous suggestion that 100,000 Jews be admitted into Palestine. The administration immediately concerned itself with devising ways and means for transporting the 100,000 and caring for them upon their arrival. With this in mind, experts were sent to London in June 1946 to work out provisionally the actual travel arrangements. The British Government co-operated with this group, but made it clear that in its view the report must be considered as a whole and that the issue of the hundred thousand could not be considered separately.

On June 11th, I announced the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on Palestine and related problems, composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Treasury, to assist me in considering the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The alternates of this Cabinet Committee, headed by Ambassador Henry F. Grady, departed for London on July 10th, 1946 to discuss with British Government representatives how the report might best be implemented. The alternates submitted on July 24th, 1946 a report, commonly referred to as the Morrison Plan, advocating a scheme of provincial autonomy which might lead ultimately to a bi-national state or to partition. However, opposition to this plan developed among members of the major political parties in the United States - both in the Congress and throughout the country. In accordance with the principle which I have consistently tried to follow, of having a maximum degree of unity within the country between the parties on major elements of American foreign policy, I could not give my support to this plan.

I have, nevertheless, maintained my deep interest in the matter and have repeatedly made known and have urged that steps be taken at the earliest possible moment to admit 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.

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In the meantime, this Government was informed of the efforts of the British Government to bring to London representatives of the Arabs and Jews, with a view to finding a solution to this distressing problem. I expressed the hope that as a result of these conversations a fair solution of the Palestine problem could be found. While all the parties invited had not found themselves able to attend, I had hoped that there was still a possibility that representatives of the Jewish Agency might take part. If so, the prospect for an agreed and constructive settlement would have been enhanced.

The British Government presented to the Conference the so-called Morrison Plan for provincial autonomy and stated that the Conference was open to other proposals. Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by means of the creation of a viable Jewish State in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine. It proposed, furthermore, the immediate issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants. This proposal received widespread attention in the United States, both in the press and in public forums. From the discussion which has ensued it is my belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States. I cannot believe that the gap between the proposals which have been put forward is too great to be bridged by men of reason and goodwill. To such a solution our Government could give its support.

In the light of a situation which has now developed I wish to state my views as succinctly as possible:

1. In view of the fact that winter will come on before the Conference can be resumed, I believe and urge that substantial immigration into Palestine cannot await a solution to the Palestine problem and that it should begin at once. Preparations for this movement have already been made by this Government and it is ready to lend its immediate assistance.

2. I state again, as I have on previous occasions, that the immigrations laws of other countries, including the United States should be liberalised with a view to the admission of displaced persons. I am prepared to make such a recommendation to the Congress and to continue as energetically as possible collaboration with other countries on the whole problem of displaced persons.

3. Furthermore, should a workable solution for Palestine be devised, I would be willing to recommend to the Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of that country.

In the light of the terrible ordeal which the Jewish people of Europe endured during the recent war and the crisis now existing, I cannot believe that a programme of immediate action along the lines suggested above could not be worked out with the co-operation of all people concerned. The administration will continue to do everything it can to this end."